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U.S. competitiveness  in the  world market has  been an issue  of
considerable interest to the American agricultural community for the
better part  of the past two decades.  As exports have represented  a
larger share of U.S.  farm output,  and as the level of these exports
has risen and  fallen unevenly over  the period,  it is easy  to see why
the issue  is viewed as important.  The purpose of this paper is to  de-
velop a perspective  on the issue that might be useful in conducting
policy education programs.
I  focus on U.S.  competitiveness  as viewed  from the standpoint  of
the general economy for two reasons.
First, when  viewed from the standpoint of the macro economy,
the  situation looks  quite  different  than when  viewed  from the  nar-
rower  confines of a single sector  such as food and agriculture.  Thus,
if we are addressing national policy or even trying to derive national
meaning out  of state and local  policy,  it is  useful to consider  this
larger picture.
Second,  I am persuaded  that it is the macro view that will  be in-
creasingly more influential in determining policy issues of all types in
the future.  Most  key elements  of the  policymaking  environment  as
they relate to U.S. competitiveness are going to be determined  on
the basis of how they affect the national economy,  not on the basis  of
how  they affect  an individual  sector.  For example,  most of the key
changes that were made in farm  policy in the 1990  farm bill were
made  in response to the overall  budget situation,  not in response  to
farm sector needs.  We can expect more of this in the future.
How  Competitive Is the United States?
We begin by assessing  the competitiveness  of the United States  in
a world context. How does the United States stack up competitively?
The answer to this question  is not as straightforward  as one might
hope or expect.  To find the answer, it is necessary to look at several
different indicators at both the macro and micro levels.
23Current Trade Account
The most obvious  of the macro measures  is  the current  trade  ac-
count,  a balance sheet of sorts of U.S.  imports and exports.  A review
of this  account shows  that the  United  States experienced  a  modest
export surplus  for most of the  1970s and through  1981.  Then,  begin-
ning  in  1982  and  continuing throughout  the  remainder  of the  1980s
and into the early  1990s,  imports exceed  exports by a wide  margin.
This is the most direct evidence of declining  U.S. competitiveness.  It
is not the only evidence,  however.
Declining  Dollar Value
The fall in the value of the dollar during the 1970s is another.  In
part,  the slide in the value  of the dollar was an indication  of the  de-
clining value attached to U.S. exports.  In the absence of a strong for-
eign demand for U.S.  assets,  as occurred later in the  1980s,  the self-
adjustment feature  of a flexible  dollar  behaved  as  it  is supposed  to.
That is,  reduced overseas demand for U.S. goods resulted in a lower
value  of the dollar which,  in turn, made  U.S.  prices more attractive
to foreign customers.
Productivity
Productivity  and rates of growth in productivity  are also useful in-
dicators of national  competitiveness.  Productivity,  as reflected  in
growth in GNP per worker,  rose rapidly  in the United  States in the
1950s and 1960s but stagnated in the  1970s.  In 1983,  it resumed its up-
ward growth though at a slower pace.  How did the U.S.  experience
compare  with that  of other countries?  International  comparisons  of
productivity  growth  reveal  a decline  in the productivity  of all  major
industrialized  economies  since  the mid-1970s,  though  the  U.S.  rate
was already lagging prior to this and has continued to lag since.  To a
major extent  this  same relationship-the  United  States lagging  and
all countries  experiencing  a decline  in productivity growth between
1960-1973  and 1973-1980-prevailed  across major sectors of all of the
major industrialized  economies,  as can be seen in Table 1.
Of course these  are comparisons  in rate  of change through  time.
But just because the United States is  lagging in the rate at which its
productivity  is increasing  doesn't mean that its absolute level  of pro-
ductivity  has fallen behind that of other nations.  Here,  too, there are
no definitive measures.  Still, there are some  clues.
Manufacturing Labor Productivity
For example,  it is possible  to compare  the labor productivity  in
manufacturing  of the major  industrialized  countries.  On the  basis of
output per hour in manufacturing,  the United States led other Or-
ganization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)
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25countries  as recently  as 1986,  though the margin  of this lead  over
several countries,  notably Germany, Japan and France, had been
substantially  reduced  over the past four decades.  A  similar trend  is
evident from  a comparison  of the  level  of compensation  per hour in
OECD  countries  over  the same period,  though  German  wages had
overtaken  U.S. wages as early  as 1980  and by  1988 all other coun-
tries except the United Kingdom (U.K.)  were close to parity with the
United  States. At least in manufacturing,  therefore,  it can be said
that the  absolute  level  of productivity  in the United  States is about
on a par with other  leading industrialized  economies,  but that the
United States is rapidly losing ground as a result of its slower rate of
growth.
Comparative Advantage
Of course,  productivity  alone  does not determine  a nation's  com-
petitiveness  in international trade.  Hypothetically,  a nation might
have an absolute advantage  in the production  of everything.  Yet, if it
is to benefit from trade  with neighboring  nations,  it  will concentrate
on the production and export of those goods  for which  it has a com-
parative  advantage.  Comparative  advantage  is determined  in large
measure  by  each  nation's resource endowment,  i.e.,  its stock  of:
land,  labor,  human  capital,  physical capital  and  other natural
resources.
As  shown in Table  2,  the  United  States  accounts  for  a leading
share of these resources  among industrialized  countries and, with
the exception of unskilled labor,  in the world.  On the basis of its rel-
ative share of these resources,  the United States would seem to have
a comparative  advantage  in the production  of agricultural  products
and in the  production  of knowledge  and high-technology  goods and
services.  However,  as can also be seen from Table 2,  the U.S. share
of some of these resources fell over the period  1963-84.  The declines
in U.S.  share of R&D scientists  and physical capital are particularly
noteworthy.  This is due to a much slower rate of growth in these fac-
tors in the United States compared  to the rates in other advanced in-
dustrialized  countries  (AIC's).  This  is  evident  from  the trends  in
growth of these factors displayed  in Table 3.
On the  basis of this  accumulated  evidence,  Morici  concludes  that
the overall trend:
. . does not reflect an absolute decline in U.S.  innovative capa-
bilities;  rather it signifies a general  evening  of relative  competi-
tive positions  among the major AIC's in activities emphasizing
the rapid evolution of new products  (p. 33).
Morici  goes  on to observe  that the rapid  accumulation  of physical
capital  by  the  newly  industrialized  countries  (Argentina,  Brazil,
Mexico,  India,  Hong Kong and  South Korea)  is a good indication
that they will become major exporters of such products as steel,  non-
26Table 2. Relative Factor Endowments  of Major Already Industrialized Countries (AIC's)  and
Six Newly  Industrialized Countries (NIC's),  1963-84
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7.1  7.8  12.6  0.30  0.9  14.6
15.5  8.7  11.5  0.25  0.8  22.6
22.9
9.1  7.1  6.8  0.14  1.3  7.6
7.7  6.9  5.5  0.08  1.1  9.1
9.5
7.1  6.6  5.3  0.11  3.2  5.3
7.5  6.0  3.9  0.06  2.6  5.8
6.1
5.6  7.0  6.5  0.14  1.1  6.2
4.5  5.1  4.9  0.07  1.0  6.8
5.9
3.8  2.5  1.7  0.06  6.5  1.7
3.9  2.9  2.1  0.03  6.1  2.1
2.2
74.6  60.4  51.2  1.35  40.4  96.7
72.7  57.3  47.0  0.68  40.9  95.5
93.3
6.2  19.3  24.8  86.7  37.2  n.a.
10.1  22.0  30.5  87.9  36.7  n.a.
n.a.
i/  Computed from a  set of 34 countries  that  in  1980 accounted  for over 85  percent  of the GDP  in
noncentrally  planned economies.
2/ Based on real gross domestic investment.
3/ Based on  number of workers in professional and technical categories.
4/ Based on number of literate  workers not categorized  as professional or technical.
5/ Based on number of illiterate workers.
6/ Based on measurement of land in different climatic zones; observation are for 1963 and 1975.
7/ Percentages  are  based on total R&D personnel  from  the  6 countries  shown  and Italy  and
Switzerland,  as provided by the National Science  Foundation and the OECD.  These 8 countries
accounted  for over 90  percent of OECD R&D activity; observations  are for 1965,  1981,  and  1984.
8/ NIC's represented  in the 34-country sample were Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,  India,  Hong Kong,
and South Korea.
Source: Morici,  p. 31.
ferrous  metals and automobiles  and that this,  in turn,  will force  the
other  industrialized countries to concentrate  on "high technology
and service activities traditionally important to the U.S." (p.  34).
Thus, while it might reflect an evening of competitive  positions,
there is no reason to believe that things will get any easier for the
United States.
Attempts  to  identify  those  industries  for which the  United  States
has the greatest competitive advantage have generally pointed to-
27Table 3.  Estimated Annual Rates of Factor Growth Relative  to Total Labor Force
1963-84  (Percent)
Capital  R&D Scientists and Engineers  Skilled Labor
1963-80  1965-84  1963-84
U.S.  1.4  0.1  0.9
Japan  8.3  5.0  2.6
Germany  3.0  4.1  2.4
France  4.9  3.6  1.9
U.K.  3.3  3.0  3.4
Canada  2.0  2.4  1.1
Six  NICs  6.2  n.a.  2.6
Source: Morici, p.  32.
ward the  high technology,  skilled labor industries.  However,  an ex-
amination of trends over the past fifteen years shows that even in
these industries  the United  States has lost ground relative  to coun-
tries like Japan  and Germany.  Trends  in three industrial  categories
for the  United  States and five  of its principal  industrialized  com-
petitors, as shown in Table 4,  illustrate the nature of this change.
As indicated  in  the upper  portion of Table 4,  as recently  as  1981,
the United States  was a net exporter  of technology-intensive  goods.
It has since  become  a net importer.  In contrast,  Japan nearly  dou-
bled its already very large net export position over the entire period.
Germany  and the U.K.  lost ground but remained net exporters.  The
significant  restructuring  that  has occurred  in Japanese  manufactur-
ing is  evident from  the  bottom portion  of Table  4.  While the United
States  reduced  its share  of manufacturing  value-added  in  the
capital-intensive  and labor-intensive categories  by 13 percent,  Japan
reduced  its share  in these categories  by 29  percent.  And,  while the
United States expanded  its share of technology-intensive  output by 7
percent, Japan expanded  its by 50 percent.
Overall U.S.  Competitiveness  Eroded
In  summary,  there  seems  little  doubt but that  the overall  com-
petitiveness  of the United  States in  world  markets has eroded  over
the past twenty years.  And, while the available evidence  does not
provide  an  entirely  clear picture,  it  seems  likely  that the  United
States  is  continuing to  lose  ground.  We now turn to the question  of
"so  what?".
Implications  of Deterioration
As surprising as it might sound,  the implications  for the average
American  of a deterioration  in U.S.  competitiveness  are not earth-
shaking. I say this for two or three reasons.
First,  as a nation,  we are not heavily dependent on international
trade. Most of the  goods  and services  we  consume  are domestically
produced.  In  1990,  87  percent of U.S.  consumption  was made in the
28United States;  13 percent was imported.  About 12 percent of the na-
tion's total output was exported.  (For agriculture,  exports accounted
for 24  percent of output,  exactly double  this share.)  While  this level
of trade is certainly  not insignificant  in an absolute  sense,  in a  rela-
tive  sense it is small  compared to domestic transactions.  It is also
useful  to remind ourselves that  even though we  are  in an era of
shrinking international  boundaries and increasing  economic  and po-
litical  integration,  international  trade has played  an even more
important role  in the U.S.  economy  and that of other  industrialized
countries during earlier periods of history.
Table 4.  Summary of Changes in Comparative Competitiveness  and Industry Structure,
1969-85
U.S.  Japan  Germany  France  U.K.  Canada
A. Changes in International  Competitiveness,  Export-Import Ratios
Technology-Intensive  1969  1.78  3.41
1973  1.48  4.58
1979  1.52  5.67
1981  1.56  7.38
1983  0.90  5.77
1985  0.75  6.67
Capital-Intensive  1969  0.53  1.50
Standardized  1973  0.41  1.22
1979  0.39  1.09
1981  0.49  1.24
1983  0.43  1.08
1985  0.31  1.04
Labor-Intensive  1969  0.33  14.92
1973  0.33  1.60
1979  0.38  1.04
1981  0.36  1.70
1983  0.20  1.83



















1.13  3.16  0.78
1.18  1.41  0.74
1.38  1.39  0.77
1.24  1.43  0.82
1.11  0.92  0.79
1.22  1.04  0.81
0.83  0.60  1.29
0.97  0.67  1.29
1.03  0.76  1.38
1.13  0.72  1.42
0.99  0.69  1.50
1.02  0.66  1.41
1.31  1.22  0.22
1.40  0.89  0.24
0.86  0.72  0.20
0.83  0.61  0.24
0.78  0.54  0.19
0.79  0.55  0.20
B.  Changes in Industry Structure, Shares of Manufacturing Value-Added
Technology-Intensive  1969  0.44  0.40
1973  0.45  0.42
1979  0.47  0.49
1981  0.47  0.54
1983  0.45  0.56
1985  0.47  0.60
Capital-Intensive  1969  0.38  0.45
Standardized  1973  0.38  0.42
1979  0.37  0.42
1981  0.36  0.38
1983  0.35  0.37
1985  0.34  0.34
Labor-Intensive  1969  0.08  0.11
1973  0.08  0.09
1979  0.07  0.08
1981  0.06  0.07
1983  0.06  0.07



















0.34  0.39  0.30
0.36  0.40  0.31
0.40  0.41  0.32
0.41  0.43  0.32
0.41  0.43  0.31
0.42  0.44  0.32
0.54  0.41  0.52
0.51  0.41  0.51
0.48  0.40  0.50
0.46  0.41  0.51
0.45  0.41  0.52
0.43  0.39  0.50
0.11  0.09  0.08
0.09  0.09  0.08
0.07  0.08  0.08
0.07  0.08  0.08
0.07  0.08  0.08
0.07  0.08  0.07
Source: Morici, p.  98.
29A second  reason why a loss in U.S.  competitiveness  is not of mon-
umental  consequence  is that its primary effect-a deficit in  the cur-
rent trade account-is a temporary phenomenon. The U.S. trade defi-
cit  is of fairly recent vintage,  beginning  in  1982 on a sustained basis.
It reached a peak  of $160 billion in  1987  and has  receded  somewhat
since.  It exists because  foreigners have  been willing to exchange
their dollars  for  U.S.  stocks,  bonds and other assets  rather  than
goods.  As this transfer  of dollars for U.S. assets becomes  less attrac-
tive, as is  certain to  occur, the value  of the dollar will fall.  When this
occurs,  U.S.  exports will become more competitively  priced,  U.S.
imports will become  more  costly,  and the magnitude  of the trade
deficit will shrink.  As Herb Stein has noted,  "the nice thing about
things that cannot go on forever  is that they won't"  (Krugman,  p.
90).
This is not to  say that a large trade deficit doesn't carry  some
risks.  It does.  Perhaps the  greatest  risk is the threat  of a sudden
flight of foreign capital  precipitated  by  a sharp  and unforeseen  loss
of confidence  in  the American  economy.  This would necessarily  re-
sult in a sharp drop in U.S. consumption  and could be highly disrup-
tive to the U.S.  economy.  But the odds of this occurring  do not seem
very  high.  And,  given the economic  and political  instability and un-
certainty  that prevails in  so many  other parts  of the  world,  it  seems
even more unlikely that the United  States will have to confront such
a problem in the near-term.
A  third  reason that I believe  it inadvisable  to  focus  on U.S.  com-
petitiveness  is that it  is  more symptom than cause. It is but one of
several  symptoms  of a  more fundamental,  more  far-reaching  prob-
lem that needs to be addressed directly rather than indirectly.
Key  Dimensions  of the Macro  Economic  Setting
To get  at this more fundamental  problem,  let me broaden the
question.  Ultimately,  our interest  in  this  and other  economic  policy
issues comes down to how they affect the standard  of living of our
population  and  how this  standard  of living might be  raised through
increased per capita consumption.  In his recent book, The Age of Di-
minished Expectations, Paul Krugman offers a useful framework  for
considering the alternative  paths to this end.  He narrows the options
to five.
(1)  Put a larger share of the population to work.  This,  of course,  is
exactly what we have been doing in the United States for most of the
past thirty years.  Thanks to a  sharp increase  in the labor force
participation rate of women and a decline in the dependent age pop-
ulation, the employment-to-population  ratio in this country has risen
steadily since the early  1960s (Terleckyj,  p.  20).  A  comparison of la-
bor force participation rates for males and females over the past sev-
eral decades indicates that in  all age cohorts  since about  1960  female
30rates have risen appreciably  while male rates have fallen slightly.
This combination  of changing labor force participation  rates and the
entrance  of the  post-WWII  baby boom  population  into  the  labor
force has caused the rate of increase in the labor force to race ahead
of population  growth over the past twenty-five  or thirty  years.  And
while  the  difference between  these rates  has  narrowed substan-
tially, the rates haven't converged yet.
The effect  of this large  addition to the workforce  on the  economy
is most graphically seen from a comparison of trends in per capita in-
come  and earnings  per worker over the past three  decades.  While
per capita  income reflects the effect of the growth  in the labor force
on personal income,  growth in earnings per worker is determined
largely by  advances  in productivity.  Prior to about 1970,  these mea-
sures rose in unison. However,  beginning around  1970,  growth  in
per worker earnings  stagnated,  reflecting  the downturn in produc-
tivity noted  earlier.  The effect  of substantial numbers of new en-
trants into the labor force,  however,  obscured  the effect of the
reduced productivity  on per capita income.
But,  the  big problem with this approach  to increased  income per
capita  is  that it is strictly  a short-term  solution.  A nation  eventually
reaches  a point at which this source  of growth is  exhausted.  And,
while the employment to population  ratio of the United  States is ex-
pected  to continue  rising until around  2010,  the rate  of growth  will
gradually diminish  as it approaches this point and  will eventually
turn negative.  At that point, if not well before,  we need to be looking
elsewhere for increases in per capita income.
(2)  Reduce savings and investment. Another  way to increase  cur-
rent consumption  is to set aside a smaller share of income for invest-
ment.  This,  too,  is characteristic  of the U.S.  experience  of the past
two or three decades.  With the exception  of private  sector expend-
itures on research  and development,  investment in capital formation
has  been stagnant  or  declining for at  least the  past two  decades
(Terleckyj,  p.  28).  The  rate of growth  in fixed  nonresidential  capital
per labor hour has trended irregularly lower  since the late  1950s.
Gross investment  in plant and equipment has  steadily grown  over
the past forty but years, but increased depreciation  has offset this
growth leaving net investment essentially unchanged.  Public invest-
ments  in infrastructure  fell throughout the  1970s and early  1980s.
And,  while public  infrastructure  investments  have increased  within
the past five years, they still remain substantially  below levels of the
late  1960s.
However,  before an individual or (in a closed  system) a nation can
invest,  it must  save. And,  while investment in the United States has
lagged in recent years,  savings has lagged even more.  The disparity
between  savings  and investment  has  been made  possible  by the
huge  inflow  of funds from abroad.  In  effect,  foreign  savers  have
filled  part of the  void  created  by a  lack of  savings in the United
31States.  Both private  savings and public  sector savings  in the United
States have fallen.





Total private  783.9
Federal  -161.3
State & local  35.4
Total government  - 125.9
Total U.S.  658.0
A  comparison  of trends  in gross savings  as a  percent of gross na-
tional  product  for OECD  countries  over the past three  decades  ap-
pears in Table  5.  As this indicates,  the major offender  in the  decline
in U.S.  savings has been government,  more  precisely the federal
government.  Personal saving  as defined by OECD (which is more
comprehensive than the definition used in the U.S. income accounts)
is shown to have rebounded  in the United States to  near its level in
the 1960s.  Using the more restrictive  definition that is customarily
cited,  personal saving as a percent  of disposable income  fell sharply
throughout the latter 1970s  and most of the 1980s.  The rate in 1990
was half what it had been in the mid-1970s.
Changes and international  differences in personal savings rates
are related to a number of different demographic,  policy, credit mar-
ket, and business factors  (Rose,  pp 32-34).  It is inevitable  that these
factors  will differ among countries and that they will change through
time.  For example,  a relatively  small share (17  percent)  of the Japa-
nese working age population is  65 years or over.  This contributes  to
their higher rate of savings.  But by the year 2020,  this share is ex-
pected to rise to 30  percent and could cut Japan's  savings rate by as
much as half (Rose,  p.  36).  Another example related to the rationing
of credit illustrates international  differences.  While a first-time home
mortgage  in the  United  States  now  requires  a  down  payment  of
around  10 percent,  in Japan it  is closer  to  40 percent  (Rose,  p.  34).
Thus, there is somewhat more incentive and need to save in Japan.
But the more  serious problem with  low savings  in the United
States stems from the large federal  deficit that emerged in the 1980s
and  has proven  to be highly resistent  to control.  This is,  by far,  the
more worrisome part of the current saving picture.  Reduced savings
lead to higher real interest rates which, in turn,  result in less invest-
ment  and reduced  rates  of economic  growth.  While  this is an  over-
simplification,  that is the essence of the problem.  And,  it is the feder-
al budget deficit that is the largest source of this savings drain.
32The  federal  budget was in  deficit  by modest  amounts throughout
the  1970s,  but in the 1980s the deficit headed sharply higher.  Though
serious efforts  were made beginning in the mid-1980s  to bring the
deficit under control,  they were of only modest success.  But this was
Table 5.  Gross Saving as  a Percentage of Gross National Product at Market Prices,
OECD  Countries
















































































































14.4  14.7  14.6  15.2  13.2
17.2  18.5  19.6  21.1  21.5
27.1  32.0  32.5  33.5  36.0
17.3  19.9  19.5  20.5  20.0
19.2  24.0  23.8  24.6  25.5
15.6  21.3  20.5  20.7  20.5
18.4  16.8  16.9  18.2  17.8
20.2  19.7  19.6  20.3  20.4
17.4  17.9  16.8  17.2  15.2
23.2  22.0  21.9  21.5  22.0
24.7  26.9  25.5  25.2  27.9
18.7  19.4  18.1  18.3  18.5
18.3  20.1  20.3  23.2  23.5
21.7  28.2  26.9  27.0  27.5
17.1  16.3  16.3  15.0  14.5
20.4  -
9.1  9.2  8.8  8.6  6.2
10.4  11.0  12.0  11.9  12.0
10.9  11.5  11.2  11.1  12.1
8.0  10.6  10.2  9.9  10.0
10.5  12.4  12.5  15.3  15.5
4.5  10.1  9.4  9.5  10.0
10.5  12.2  13.1  12.5  11.1
8.3  8.6  8.0  8.6  9.0
12.8  11.0  9.9  9.6  10.0
13.8  15.4  14.3  14.1  15.8
10.7  8.8  7.9  8.4  8.5
7.8  7.7  7.8  7.9  7.0
17.2  18.1  17.5  17.5  17.5
6.6  4.6  3.2  2.5  3.4
-2.4  -3.1  -2.2  -2.1  -2.0
-2.2  -2.5  - 1.7  0.0  -0.5
4.4  4.8  6.6  8.1  8.1
0.8  0.5  0.6  1.1  1.5
1.8  2.4  1.9  1.4  2.0
-7.6  -7.8  -7.2  -6.7  -7.0
1.3  0.0  0.6  3.2  3.3
33
(a) Net saving (after capital consumption)  only. In other countries,  net household  saving as a per-
centage of net national product was 2-3 percent below the gross saving ratio in the 1980s.
Source:  OECD  National  Accounts  and Barclays Bank  Economics Department  as  cited  in Harold
Rose, The Question of Saving. Washington,  D.C.: British-North American Committee,  1991.
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,before the enormous  cost of the widespread  failure of savings and
loans and banks became evident.  It is now estimated that deposit in-
surance  spending  alone  will  reach  $115  billion in  1992.  Thus,  under
the best  of circumstances,  the federal budget deficit  will reach new
heights in FY 1992.  And while resolution of the failed  financial  in-
stitutions is expected  to result in an equally  sharp drop in the deficit
beginning in FY 1993,  even removing the effects  of the deposit insur-
ance outlays  and those  associated with the business  cycle (as repre-
sented by  the standardized-employment  deficit)  still  yields a  deficit
of around $170 to $190 billion as far as budget forecasters are able to
see into the future.
As is  all  too clear  from the experience  of the United  States in re-
cent years,  a reduction in savings and investment is not a very satis-
factory  means of improving the nation's  standard  of living.  It will
work for awhile, but only for awhile.
(3)  Import more than you export. Another  way to  increase  con-
sumption and improve the standard of living of the nation is to im-
port more  than you export.  This is another  approach with which the
United  States has had first-hand experience,  as described  above.
This can  be achieved  by borrowing  from  abroad  or  by selling  U.S.
assets to foreign investors. The United States has done both in re-
cent years.  Both can go on as long as foreigners  are willing, that is as
long  as they  have the dollars  and as  long  as the  loan  or the  invest-
ment is attractive,  neither  of which  will continue  indefinitely.  Thus,
this can't be considered a long-term solution either.
(4)  Sell exports at a higher price than imports. This can be done,
but only when a nation is producing  a high-quality product for which
foreign consumers  are  willing to pay  a premium.  The impressive
growth of the Japanese  automobile industry  is  a case  in point.  Yet,
this approach  to increased  economic well-being  requires another  in-
gredient.  Namely,  it requires that a nation be more productive in its
economic performance  . . . which  is a topic that  is substantially
broader  than the  export  market alone  and brings  us to  our  final
approach.
(5)  Increase productivity. As Krugman says,  "productivity isn't ev-
erything,  but in the long run it is almost everything"  (p.  9).  In com-
parison with the first three options described  above, this  is the  only
one  that can  be sustained  for more than  a temporary  period or
doesn't carry with it significant risks.  The fourth option  of exporting
at a higher price than you are importing is increased productivity  in
a different and more restricted form.  To put dimensions  on it, Krug-
man estimates that had  U.S.  productivity  increased as  fast over  the
last twenty years as it did for the preceding seventy years, the pres-
ent standard  of living of Americans  would be about 25  percent high-
er than it  is.  This  is a benefit of enormous  magnitude  far over-
shadowing the benefit associated  with any  other plausible option for
improving the economic well-being of the nation.
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It should be said at the outset that the causes of change in the rate
of productivity  growth are not very well understood,  at least  not in
the aggregate.  Though many possible  explanations  have  been sug-
gested  over the years,  no  single  explanation  is  completely  convinc-
ing. Rather,  it appears likely that a multitude  of different factors are
responsible.  Thus, attempts to turn around productivity trends in the
United States will almost  certainly require action across  a very
broad front.  Productivity suffers whenever resources of value are
not used to fullest benefit.  And that covers a lot of ground in contem-
porary American society.  But perhaps a few  general points will help
place the task in perspective and suggest some possible approaches.
Sources of Lost Productivity
The causes of lost productivity are both complex and pervasive.
They  are spread  throughout  our economic,  social  and  political  sys-
tems.  Lower  productivity  doesn't result just from  the  way we make
things and provide services or from the curriculums  in our schools  or
from the number of unemployed.  It also stems from the nature of
our consumption patterns and lifestyles,  our personal values and be-
liefs,  the use we make  of public infrastructure,  and last,  but cer-
tainly not least,  our public policies.
Examples are everywhere  around  us. Americans  live in large
houses relative to most of the rest of the world. And,  despite smaller
families,  fewer persons per household  and an aging population,  the
average  size of new houses  constructed  between  1970  and 1986  rose
by over  20  percent.  Should  public  policy continue  to be  used to  at-
tract so many resources  to this use?  Or, to take another  example,
should  the  United  States  continue  to use its  school  facilities  and  its
trained corps  of teachers  for less than  70 percent  of the year when
the educational  systems of many  other  countries  have  school  years
that are as much as one-third longer than ours?
Reducing the Federal Budget Deficit
At the  macro  economic  level,  the  single  most important action  to
be taken is to substantially  reduce,  if not eliminate,  the federal bud-
get deficit.  Historically,  increased  productivity has correlated rather
closely with the accumulation  of capital stock in its many  forms-
plant and equipment,  R&D expenditures,  the education and experi-
ence of the work force, and public infrastructure.  But before we can
turn the  corner in the accumulation  of capital  stock,  we  must in-
crease  savings.  The most  direct,  most effective  route  to that end  is
through federal deficit reduction.  And,  as we already know,  that
isn't going to be easy.  Paul Krugman  summarizes the situation as
follows:
35If the apparent acceptance  of more or less stagnant  living stand-
ards is the  most striking feature  of the diminished  expectations
Americans  have for their economy,  the acceptance  of a more or
less permanent budget deficit is the most spectacular  example of
the diminished expectations  the public has for its elected leaders
(p.  63).
Since I am persuaded that our elected leaders are a more-or-less  ac-
curate reflection  of the constituents they serve,  I  would only amend
Krugman  to the point that the budget  deficit  is perhaps  the most
spectacular  example of the diminished expectations  we have of our-
selves and our institutions.
Tight Public Budgets  and Productivity
Budget austerity at the national level is going to have two major
effects,  already evident.
First, it will result in a shift in program  responsibility  from the fed-
eral government to state governments. This is already well underway
and will probably accelerate.  Since states are required to balance
their budgets,  on the whole they have demonstrated greater fiscal
responsibility  than the federal government.  Fully two-thirds of all
states have  raised taxes this year.  However  most states have
reduced  services too and, increasingly, they are shifting program re-
sponsibilities  on down the line to counties,  cities  and localities.  In
New  York State it is estimated that 60 cents of every county budget
dollar is spent for activities mandated by the State (Wall Street Jour-
nal, p. A20).
The other effect of budget austerity  will be for governments to turn
from the use of the "carrot"  to use of the "stick." That is, there is like-
ly to be greater use of regulatory  powers to achieve  public aims.  Be-
cause  it can be  administered  in more capricious,  less  flexible  ways,
increased  regulation  risks extracting  a high cost in reduced  produc-
tivity.
As an example,  take just one aspect of the nation's environmental
policy agenda, the clean-up of toxic  wastes,  as examined  in a recent
New York  Times article.  The cost of fully restoring  the 400,000  to
450,000 sites has been estimated at $300 to $700 billion.  Now consider
one  particular  site,  an  11-acre  property  in Holden,  Missouri.  There
are a range  of options for making the site  safer than it presently  is.
These options range from permanently  isolating the  site from the
community at a cost of $71,000;  to cleaning the stream bed and cap-
ping the site with  10 inches  of clay  at $3.7 million;  to removing  con-
taminated soil  and materials,  incinerating  the  most contaminated
and burying the rest in a special landfill  at a cost of $13.6  million; to
removing  14,000  tons of contaminated  material  and incinerating  it
elsewhere at a cost of $41.5  million.  Though EPA has recommended
36the $13.6  million option,  is the loss in productivity  worth this price?
As the New York Times writer observes,
(One) may  wonder whether the more  flexible use of land  is
worth the extra $900,000 an acre beyond the cost of scrubbing
the stream and  capping  the property.  And  still others  may ask
whether  a bare-bones  fix-one that reduces  neighborhood  can-
cer risks to, say,  one-thousandth the chance  of getting cancer
from a  lifetime of normal  exposure to the sun-would  not be
adequate (New York Times, p. 28).
Questions  of this nature are going to have to be confronted across
a broad range of public policy if we are to make any progress in rais-
ing productivity.
Implications for U.S.  Food and Agriculture
The differences  between the food and agricultural  sector and the
overall economy tend to be of degree rather than kind. Of course,
the United States is a large net exporter of agricultural products and
has been for the better part of the past thirty years. This nation pos-
sesses a huge natural resource base that makes it a leading producer
of many commodities.  The United  States  has a strong advantage  in
the production  of coarse grains,  for example,  and benefits  from ad-
vanced livestock  and  poultry  industries.  And,  it  is favored  in many
other  ways  including  a  large  and  sophisticated  system  of research,
education and training of which many readers of this paper  are a
part.
Despite the sector's many advantages, however,  there are signs
that it is losing ground.  Growth in productivity  has slowed  substan-
tially since  1950 and is projected  to decline still further in the future
(Barkama,  p.  265).  This is true of aggregate  farm production and for
most individual  commodities  as well.  Foreign crop  yields have gen-
erally risen faster than U.S.  crop yields over the past twenty-five
years,  though  the United  States continues  to hold an absolute  yield
advantage  for several crops.  And for some  crops,  such as course
grains,  the advantage is sizable.
A major drawback  to making international comparisons of com-
petitiveness is that most of the world's agricultural economies are so
protected  and  the markets  so  distorted  as  to limit  their usefulness.
Assessments of the  effect of trade liberalization  offer a useful means
of looking beyond the existing distortions and predicting  what trade
would be with at least some of the present barriers lowered or re-
moved.  Results  of a recent U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (USDA)
analysis of the effect on U.S.  exports of adopting  a trade policy con-
sistent with the U.S.  position in the Uruguay  Round General Agree-
ment  on Tariffs and  Trade  (GATT)  negotiations  are displayed  in
Table 6  (Office of Economics,  USDA).  These results, which are con-
sistent  with those  of other studies,  indicate  that  most U.S.  com-
37Table 6.  Estimated Effect  on U.S.  Exports in 1996 of GATT Agreement Consistent With U.S.
Proposal,  by Commodity
Commodity Percent Change
Wheat  +  16-20
Corn  +10-12
Rice  +  32-35
Cotton  +  5-6
Soybeans  +2
Peanuts  (+  6,150)
Tobacco  +  10-15
Sugar  (+  20-28)
Fruit and tree nuts  +  10-12





Dairy products  (+  32)
All  commodities  +  16-22
(  )  indicates change  in imports.
Source:  Office  of Economics,  USDA, Economic Implications of the  Uruguay Round for U.S. Agri-
culture, May  1991.
modities would benefit  from  expanded  exports under trade  liber-
alization.  The exceptions are milk,  sugar and peanuts, each of which
would be confronted  with sharply higher imports than are permitted
now under the existing quotas.
From the standpoint  of processed  foods,  international trade  is  not
nearly  as important  to  the United States  as  is trade  in raw  agri-
cultural commodities.  In 1987-1988,  exports accounted for 4.3 per-
cent of total shipments from U.S.  processing plants while imports
were the equivalent  of 5.6 percent of shipments.  These  aggregate
measures have remained near these levels for at least the past twen-
ty years.  Of course,  there is some variation  among industries within
the sector with the less highly processed foods generally playing a
more important role in exports.
That the United States does not export a large share of its proc-
essed  foods  does not mean  that U.S.  food  processors  are not  in-
volved in sales abroad,  however.  To the contrary,  they are involved
in a major way,  but mainly through the licensing of production  by
foreign  producers  or by direct  investment  abroad.  There are many
reasons  for  going  this route-lower  transportation  costs;  easier-to-
deal-with regulatory requirements;  easier-to-adjust-to  local tastes
and marketing  opportunities;  and improved  access  to  food distribu-
tion and marketing systems.  In 1988,  U.S. food processors  had direct
investment abroad  of around  $13 billion  (USDA,  ERS,  p.  25).  Of
course,  it works  the same way for foreign  food  processors.  In  1988,
they held  direct investments  in the United  States  of $16.4  billion.
Handy and Epps report that in  1988 large U.S.  food processors man-
ufactured  about 24  percent  of their output through  foreign  subsidi-
38aries while exporting only about 3 percent from U.S. plants (p.  8).
This is consistent  with Connor's finding that in the early  1980s,  more
than 31 percent  of U.S.-based food processor sales took place in for-
eign markets  and that 85  percent of these  sales were from plants lo-
cated abroad rather than exports (p. 86).
To summarize,  the outlook for  U.S. food and agricultural  pros-
perity is dependent  on the  same factors  as identified  for the U.S.
economy in general.  Attention to productivity  is the essential  ingre-
dient.  Increased  investment  in plant  and  equipment,  research  and
technology,  infrastructure,  and education  and training are required
to achieve improved  productivity growth.  And this increased  invest-
ment,  in turn,  is dependent  on  a sound macro-economic  policy
which,  above  all else,  will require  a serious reduction in the budget
deficit.  What perhaps sets agriculture  most apart from the other sec-
tors,  however,  is the need  to remove the many  impediments  to im-
proved productivity that are found  in public policy as it relates to
food and agriculture.
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